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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
----------------------------
STATE OF' UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v- Case No. 18987 
JAY RICHARD NEWTON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Appeal from a conviction of forgery, a second degree 
felony, in violation of 76-6-501, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
(as amended), before the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., 
Judge, in the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was found guilty of forgery, a 
second-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated 
76-6-501, 1953 (as amended). He appeals from the denial of 
his motion to suppress evidence. 
__ __ 
Appellant was charged with forgery, a second-degree 
felony, and theft, a third degree felony. On January 14, 
1983, appellant made a motion to suppress evidence. The 
motion was denied by the Honorable James S. Sawaya, Third 
District Judge. Appellant was subsequently convicted of 
forgery. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the convict ion in 
the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 20, 1982, Jim Clark, the front-end 
manager for Ream's Bargain Annex located at 70675 South 7th 
East, (transcript of January 24, 1983, hereinafter T., p.4) 
cashed a check for an individual. The check was made payable 
to Robert Lynn Frear in the amount of $397.43 and was drawn on 
the account of Peck & Peck, a painting company (T. 44). 
Following standard procedure, Clark wrote the individual's 
social security number, driver's license number, and birth 
date on the back of the check (T. 46). Later, however, Clark 
testified that he could not describe the individual who had 
given him the check because the time he had spent with him 
was so brief (T. 46) 
valley Bank stopped payment on the check because the 
signature on it was improperly written (T. 15). It was then 
discovered that Peck & Peck did not authorize the issuance of 
the check ( T. 14). Furthermore, Robert Lynn Frear had never 
received the check (T. 17). 
Frear explained that he had lost his driver's 
license in the summer of 1981. He did not worry about it, 
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however, because it had expired and was therefore invalid (T. 
18). 
Frear also stated that the social security number on 
the forged check was his (T. 21). He testified further that 
he was acquainted with the appellant (T. 19). 
Detective George Sinclair arrested appellant on 
January 19, 1982, on the charge of aggravated burglary (T. 40, 
Hearing of January 14, 1983, hereinafter H., P. 10) Sinclair 
discovered in appellant's possession a Capital City Bank 
account card issued under the name of Robert Lynn Frear (T. 
36). Appellant was incarcerated after this arrest (T. 41). 
On February 18, 1982, Dennis Holm of Adult Probation 
and Parole went to investigate a shooting at the residence of 
Debbie and Leon Smith (T. 29). Leon Smith was on parole from 
the state prison (T. 26). During the investigation, Holm 
found Frear's lost driver's license in one of Smith's folders 
which contained other drivers' licenses, social security 
cards, and blank checks. (T. 28). Frear's photograph had 
been cut from his 1981 license and replaced by appellant's 
photograph. Appellant's photograph had been taped into place. 
( T. 37). 
Albert Nortz, a Sandy City Police officer, was 
investigating the suspected forged check (T. 61). He 
telephoned Sgt. Sinclair and informed him that the appellant 
was a good suspect (H. 4). 
With the knowlege linking appellant to the Frear 
bank account card and driver's license but without a search 
-3-
warrant, Nortz interviewed appellant who was already in the 
Salt Lake County Jail (T. 56) on April 14, 1982. Appellant 
had been incarcerated for three months at the time of the 
interview (T. 40, 56). Detective Nortz, prior to questionin'J, 
advised appellant of his rights by reading from a 
Miranda card. (H. 6, T. 57). Appellant acknowledged that he 
understood those rights and stated that he would be willing to 
talk with Detective Nortz without having an attorney present 
( H. 6). Appellant made no effort to cont act an attorney ( H. 
5), although he had been represented by an attorney three 
months earlier on the unrelated charge (H. 10, 11). Having 
obtained appellant's approval to continue the interview, 
Detective Nortz showed him two checks, one of which was the 
"Peck" check (T. 6) with Robert Frear as the designated payee. 
Appellant claimed to know nothing about them (H. 6). Nortz 
asked appellant if he minded filling out a handwriting speci-
men. He explained to appellant that it was for comparison 
purposes (H. 7). Nortz also told appellant that he had a 
right to refuse to ( H. 8) cooperate. Appellant, however, said 
he had nothing to hide and provided the handwiting sample. (H. 
8) 
Both the suspected forged "Peck" check and ap-
pellant's handwriting exemplar were sent to a handwriting 
expert at the State of Utah Crime Laboratory H. 9, T. 60). 
The expert testified that the same person had authored both 
the signature on the "Peck" check made out to Robert Frear and 
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appellant's handwriting exemplar. 
It appears that appellant had obtained Frear's 
driver's license and social security number and used them to 
forge a detective signature and cash a check made out to 
Frear. He altered the driver's license, replacing Frear's 
picture with his own (T. 20), and changed the expiration date 
to 1982 (T. 24). 
Following a bench trial, appellant was found guilty 
of forgery. He was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for an 
indeterminate sentence of one to five years (T. 49). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT VOLUNTARILY AND INTELLIGENTLY 
WAIVED HIS RIGHTS UNDER MIRANDA. 
Appellant contends that he was denied his right to 
counsel because counsel was not present during the police 
interrogation of the forgery charge against him. Appellant 
makes this contention in spite of the fact that he was given a 
warning and voluntarily and intelligently consented to 
the interrogation. 
At the out set , it is import ant to note that several 
factors distinguish the instant case from mere right to coun-
sel analysis. These facts are that first, appellant had ob-
tained counsel three months earlier for an unrelated 
aggravated robbery charge; (H.10) and second, that it had been 
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three months since the last unrelated interr°']iltion. This ')ap 
in both the time and subject matter of the laler interrogation 
demonstrates that the issue in this case cannot be properly 
framed simply as a right to counsel problem. Recause of these 
unique circumstances, the issue is rather the larger problem 
of whether appellant did in fact voluntarily and knowingly 
waive his rights, including his right to counsel, 
prior to the separate and distinct forgery interrogation. 
The record is clear that appellant affirmatively 
waived both his right to counsel and his right to remain si-
lent after Detective Nortz informed him of his rights. The 
recent Supreme Court case of _ _':._· __ M_osl_e_z, 423 U.S. 96, 
96 S.Ct. 321 (1975) is factually very similar to the instant 
case and is controlling of the issue. In both !'1_o_s_l:_ey and the 
instant case, the defendants were initially arrested on one 
charge, interrogated about it, and then later questioned about 
another unrelated offense following the readmonition of 
Miranda. They are dissimilar, however, in that in the 
interval between the unrelated interrogations was only two 
hours whereas in the instant case, the interval between the 
two interrogations was three months. Also, the defendant in 
Mosley never saw an attorney in relation to the first, 
unrelated charge; while in the instant case, appellant saw an 
attorney for the first charge, but did not ask to see him on 
the unrelated charge three months later. 
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The Supreme Court in said that it was clearly 
impermissible for the police to continue interrogation after 
only a momentary cessation, it added that to impose a blanket 
prohibit ion a0ainst the taking of voluntary statements, 
re0ardless of the circumstances, "would transform the 
safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate 
police investigative activity, and deprive suspects of an 
opportunity to make informed and intelligent assessments of 
their interests." .!_'!_. at 102. The Court then stated 
Clearly, therefore, neither this passage 
nor any other passage in the Miranda 
opinion can sensibly be read a 
per se proscription of indefinite duration 
upon any further questioning by any police 
officer on any subject, once the person in 
custody has indicated a desire to remain 
silent. Id. at 102-103. (Footnote 
omitted) 
The Court then explained that the most critical inquiry is 
whether the person's right to cut off questioning was 
"scrupulously honored" by the police. Id. This respect for 
the person's rights does not mean, however, that once that 
person has indicated a desire to remain silent, further 
inter rog at ion may resume only when counsel is present . Id. at 
104 (footnote 10). The Court in then found, following 
a review of the circumstances, that the defendant's right to 
cut off questioning was fully respected. 
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In the instant case, appellant's right to cut off 
questioning was scrupulously honored following his invocation 
of the right to counsel during the course of the first 
interrogation on the unrelated burglary charge. Three months 
later, pursuant to legitimate investigative action, 
questioning on a different matter occurred. This separate ano 
distinct interrogation was preceded by a warning, ano 
only upon receipt of the new warning did appellant voluntarily 
and intelligently consent to the questioning. 
Appellant affirmatively waived his right to remain 
silent by agreeing to speak with Detective Nortz. In 
addition, appellant waived his right to have an attorney 
present by acknowledging that he understood his rights 
and that there was no need for him to contact an attorney. 
Appellant then explained that he "had nothing to hide" (H. 8) 
and demonstrated his willingness to cooperate at this 
custodial interrogation. 
The test for whether the waiver of a right is valio 
was formulated in 304 U.S. 458, 464 ( 1938): 
"A waiver is ordinarily an intentional re-
linquishment or abandonment of a known 
right or privilege. The determination of 
whether there has been an intelligent 
waiver •.• must depend, in each case, 
upon the particular facts and cir-
cumstances surrounding that case, includ-
ing the background, experience, and con-
duct of the accused." 
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In the instant case, the circumstances clearly demonstrate 
that appellant knowingly and intentionally relinquished his 
right to have an attorney present. Appellant did not request 
an attorney after being reinformed of this right by Detective 
Nortz. He cannot complain of the failure to have an attorney 
present when counsel's absence during this particular 
custodial interrogation was the product of his own informed 
choice. This allowance for a subsequent waiver of the right 
to counsel is supported by the recent case of 
463 A.2d 876 (Md.Ct. Spec. App. 1983). In the 
defendant made incriminating statements in response to police 
initiated questioning despite his earlier invocation of the 
right to counsel the previous day during custodial 
interrogation about an unrelated crime. The defendant, 
Offutt, was arrested for burglary and was taken to the 
Montgomery County Detention Center. The police attempted to 
question him. Afte being given a warning, however, 
the defendant invoked his right to consult with an attorney. 
The first interrcxiat ion of the defendant was then terminated. 
The second interrogation of Offutt on the unrelated 
charges occurred when a detective, who was not involved in the 
first interrogation, met with the defendant, thirty hours 
after the first questioning, during which time the defendant 
had invoked his right to cousel. Id. at 881, the detective on 
this second occasion told the defendant that he faced further 
charges on additional burglaries and then issued the 
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warning. The defendant then affirmatively stated that he did 
not want a lawyer during this second inter rO<Jat ion and gave an 
inculpatory statement. Id. at 882. 
Offutt contended that the aclmission of this 
statement into evidence violated his rights under __ v_._ 
384 U.S. 436 (1966), as interpreted by 
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). The court in 
held, however, that was inapplicable to the 
case before it. Since Edwards was factually dissimilar from 
Offutt inasmuch as focused upon a single investigation 
of a single crime and did not address the Offutt circumstance 
of two separate police investigation of two separate crimes. 
Id. at 880. The Offutt court then observed: 
It is Michigan v. Mosely that 
controls that-phenomen0r1l"nvolving 
separate investigations of separate 
crimes. The appellant seeks to slip out 
from under the controlling authority of 
Michigan v. Mosley by pointing out that 
the specific right invoked in the initial 
int e rrog at ion in Michigan v. Mosley was 
only the right toSITence, whereas -the 
right invoked in the initial int errog at ion 
in this case was the 
more-difficult-to-waive right to counsel. 
That coincident ally happens to be very 
true, but it is not the doctrinal hinge on 
which Michigan v. Mosley pivoted. The 
Supreme Court did not deal with what would 
be required properly to resume an 
int errog at ion, fol lowing the invocation of 
either right, with respect to a sing le 
case but went to great le ng ht s to point 
out the separate natures of the two 
investigations and consequently of the two 
interrogations. 
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Of critical significance was the fact 
that, after Mosley had invoked his right 
under Miranda in the first investigation, 
the different team of officers 
investigating the second crime 
scrupulously "restricted the second 
interrogation to a crime that had not been 
a subject of the earlier interrogation." 
Id. at 881 (Citation Omitted). 
and the more recent 
Q_r_e_9_o_n __ _______ u.s. ______ , 103 s. ct. 2830 (1983) 
which was a plurality opinion interpreting do 
not apply to the circumstances of the instant case, as well. 
In the case at bar, the second interrogation of appellant came 
a significant time after his invocation of the right to 
counsel and the second interrogation of appellant was 
restricted to a crime that had not been the subject of the 
first interrogation. 
Furthermore, a recent case from the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina makes the point that a defendant's invocation 
of his right to counsel for one crime does not automatically 
attach to a subsequent interrogation of the accused for 
another crime. This case, 304 S.E.2d 579 
(N.C. 1983) differs somewhat from the present case in that 
officers questioned the defendant about a a crime (unaware 
that he had invoked his right to counsel) and he unexpectedly 
confessed to another, unrelated crime. Without deciding the 
issue of whether the officers erred in initiating the 
questioning, the court held that the defendant's right to 
counsel was not violated when he when he confessed to a crime 
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about which there had never been any intent to question him, 
and for which he had never requested an attorney. The court 
made the following statement: 
It is true that under F.dwards v. Arizona 
once a suspected crimina1-1nvokes-h1s __ _ 
right to counsel, he may not be questioned 
further until counsel is provided unless 
the suspected criminal himself initiates 
the dialogue at which time he may waive 
his right to have an attorney present. 
However, in the case sub judice, defendant 
never invoked his right to counsel with 
respect to the Moody (the unrelated) --
murder:-Jfe-SpecfficaITy stat-ed-,-pi'Tor to 
any-questioning, that he just wanted "to 
go ahead and get this over with. I do not 
want a lawyer." Officer Price further 
testified on voir dire that he told 
defendant for his best interest he ought 
to obtain a lawyer before trial.(Emphasis 
added) 
Franklin, held that a defendant does not 
insulate himself entirely from any future custodial inquiry 
once he has invoked his right to counsel for an earlier and 
unrelated crime. Such a conclusion promotes the interests of 
suspects to evaluate their interests with respect to new 
charges. An earlier invocation of right to counsel with 
respect to an earlier, unrelated charge does not constitute an 
eternal moratorium on a suspect's future exercise of his 
perogative when confronted with different allegations on a 
subsequent occasion. 
When this aspect of E:_r_<:_nkliri_ is applied to the 
instant case, it is clear that appellant voluntarily and 
intelligently waived his right to counsel after receivinq his 
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rights before the detective's forgery interrogation. 
Detective Nortz scrupulously honored appellant's 
rights and restricted his questions to the new forgery charge. 
A defendant should have the affirmative opportunity 
to decide with each charge whether he will invoke the right to 
silence or to an attorney so long as those rights are 
"scrupulously honored" by the custodial authorities and the 
subsequent relinquishment of either or both of those rights is 
shown to be intelligent and knowing. 
An Eighth Circuit case, __ 495 F. 2d 3 5 
(8th Cir. 1974) held that expressly allows the 
defendant to waive his right to counsel following counsel's 
earlier appointment: 
If an accused can voluntarily, knowingly 
and intelligently waive his right to 
counsel before one has been appointed, 
there is no compelling reason to hold that 
he may not voluntarily, knowingly, and 
intelligently waive his right to have 
counsel present at an interrogation after 
counsel has been appointed. Of course, 
the Government will have a heavy burden to 
show that the waiver was knowingly and 
intelligently made, but we perceive no 
compelling reason to adopt the per se rule 
advocated by petitioner. In fact, 
expressly recognizes that such 
interrogation may continue without 
presence of counsel, thouqh the burden of 
showing a knowing and intelligent waiver 
is a heavy one. Moore at 37. 
Although appellant in this case testified that he 
"could not recall" receiving a second Miranda warning prior to 
Nortz's interrogation (H.14), the record is clear that 
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appellant not only received a !'!_i_r_a_n_rl_a_ warning (H. 6), but also 
acknowledged that he understoocl it, anrl vnlunt ar i ly consent eel 
to talk with Detective Nortz. Appellant state that he woulrl 
be willing to talk to the officer without having an ilttorney 
present (H. 6). Significantly appellant rlirl not deny being 
re-Mirandized. The State has met its burden of showing a 
voluntary and intelligent waiver. 
Finally, has been applied to right to 
counsel cases when factually warranted. Two Wisconsin cases, 
Wentela v. State, 290 N.W.2d 312 (Wis. 1980), and Leach v. 
265 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1978), applied even 
through the suspect invoked the right to counsel. The court 
in explained its decision thusly: 
The defendant argues that Mosely is 
limited to those situationS-1n-wl1ich a 
defendant invokes only the right to remain 
silent, and that it was expressly not 
addressed to the question of whether 
statements obtained after a defendant 
requests an attorney are a per se 
violation of Miranda. To a degree, the 
defendant is correct. In an explanatory 
footnote, the court in Mosley stated, "The 
present case does not involve the 
procedures to be followed if the person in 
custorly asks to consult with a lawyer, 
since Mosley made no such request at 
anytime:W--Michigan v. Mosley, 423 u.s. at 
101, n. 7, 96s-:Ct-:-at3g-:--Nevert he less, 
the fundamental concept expressed in 
Mosley is that a defendant's exercise of 
one of the rights enumerated in Miranda -
whether it be the right to terminate __ _ 
questioning or the right to the assistance 
of a lawyer-will not prohibit all 
subsequent questioing under all 
circumstances. Indeed, it was probably to 
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differ with the Mosely majority for 
failing to broac'len--lt-s basis of decision 
tht Mr. Justice WHITE, in his concurring 
opinion, stated: "Unless an individual is 
incompetent, we have in the past rejected 
any paternalistic rule protecting a 
c'!efendant from his intelligent and 
voluntary decisions about his own criminal 
case . . . To c'lo so would be to "imprison 
a man in his privileges.'" 423 U.S. at 
108-09, 96 s.ct. at 329, quoting Ac'lams v. 
United States ex rel. Mccann, 317-u:S.---
2-69 .--2iro-.-T3-s.-cY.-2:f6-;-Trr:. Ed 26 < 1942>. 
Leach at 501. There is no allegation in the instant 
case that appellant is incompetent. He was therefore quite 
capable of choosing not to consult with an attorney prior to 
talking with Detective Nortz. 
adds further weight to the proposition 
that Mosely, _:>upra, may be applied toward both the right to 
remain silent and the right to counsel. 
Appellant relies heavily upon Edwards v. Arizona, 
451 U.S. 477 (1981), for the proposition that once an accused 
has expressed his desire to deal with the police only through 
counsel, he is not subject to any subsequent int errog at ion 
until counsel has been made available to him. Edwards, 
however, is factually distinguishable from the instant case. 
In the defendant was arrested on one 
charge, informec'I of his Miranda rights, and he subsequently 
confessed. 
differs from the instant case 
inasmuch as the lapse of time between interrogations in 
was less than 24 hours, the interrogation was 
-15-
involuntary, and the second interrogation concerned the 
identical topic which had been terminated by the defendant's 
specific request for appointment of counsel. In the instant 
case, the interrogations were three months apart, concerned 
entirely different subject, and the rights of appellant were 
scrupulously honored by the police and voluntarily waived by 
him. Furthermore, in counsel was not provided to the 
defendant; in the instant case, appellant received counsel for 
the burglary charges, and three months later, before the 
unrelated interrogation, was told he had the right to have an 
attorney present, a right he declined to exercise. The 
factual discrepancies illustrate that is not 
directly on point and does not control the instant case. 
Another problem with applying to the instant 
case is that the record is unclear as to whether appellant 
requested counsel on the prior charge specifically to help him 
with all custodial interrogations or for other purposes. The 
importance of this distinction was made clear in Jordan v. 
Watkins, 681 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir. 1982): 
Appellant contends that Miranda as applied 
in Edwards requires the suppression of his 
recorded confession. We conclude that the 
guest ion before the Court in Edwards is 
clearly distinguishable from 
presented in the case sub judice. In 
Edwards, the Court addressed the issue of 
"whether the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments require the suppression of a 
post-arrest confession, which was obtained 
after Edwards had invoked his right to 
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interrogation." 451 U.S. at 478, 101 
-s:-ct-.--at-Ts-81, 68 L.Ed.2d at 382 (emphasis 
added). In the instant case, Jordan never 
requested the assistance of counsel with 
repect to custodial interrogation; he 
merely told the judge that he would like 
appointed counsel to assist him in further 
judicial proceedings. In Edwards, the 
expressed desire to deal wTth-tne police 
only through counsel was made to the 
police during a custodial interrogation 
session. Unlike Edwards, Jordan never 
"invoked his right_t_o have counsel present 
during custodial interrogation" or 
"expressed his desire to deal with the 
police only through counsel." Moreover, 
he expressed no reluctance to speak with 
his interviewers, and he never attempted 
to cut off quest ion i ng . 
Id. at 1073. (Emphasis added in the original, footnotes 
omitted) 
In discussing the reasoning behind this distinction, 
the court drew on the following anaysis: 
[S]ome defendants may well wish to have an 
attorney to represent them in legal 
proceedings, yet to wish to assist the 
investigation by talking to an 
investigating officer without an attorney 
present. "While the suspect has an 
absolute right to terminate station-house 
interrogation, he also has the prerogative 
to then and there answer questions, if 
that be his choice." To hold that a 
request for appointment of an attorney at 
arraignment would bar an investigating 
officer from later finding out if 
defendant wishes to exercise the 
prerogative would transform the Miranda 
safeguard, among which is the right to 
obtain appointed counsel, "into wholly 
irrational obstacles to legitimate police 
investigative activity, and deprive 
suspects of an opportunity to make 
informed and intelligent assessment of 
their interests." 
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Id. at 1073 and 1074. Adoption of appellant's blanket 
interpretation of request of counsel would actually inhibit a 
defenc1ant 's right to make c1ecisions for himself, lessening his 
role in his own trial. 
Since it is unknown whether appellant maae a 
specific request to have an attorney present at the custodial 
interrogation, his claim is impossible to consider. To 
assume, without knowing, the purposes for which appellant 
invoked his right to an attorney would diminsh rather than 
enhance his rights. 
The inapplicability of to the 
particular circumstances in the instant case, 
becomes more evident in light of the Court's recent decision 
in 9regon v. Bradshaw u.s. I 103 S.Ct. 2830 (1983). 
Bradshaw's plurality opinion, following a review of its 
holding in stated: 
[there] we held that after the right to 
counsel had been asserted by an accused, 
further interrogation of the accusea 
should not take place "unless the accused 
himself initiates further communication, 
exchanges, or conversation with the 
police." 451 u.s. at 485, • 
Bradshaw at 2834. 
Justice Rehnquist then explained that even after 
the accused has initiated a conversation with the police 
following his invocation of the right to counsel, "the burden 
remains upon the prosecution to show that subsequent events 
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indicated a waiver of the . right to have counsel present 
during the interrogation." Id. The plurality in 
agreed with the trial court's finding that the police 
had committed no imrropriety but instead had properly advised 
the defendant of his rights and the defendant, having 
understood those rights, knowingly waived them. Id. at 2835. 
Significantly, Justice Powell, concurring in 
stated that, he did not agree with the plurality's apparent 
adoption of a rule which requires a two-step analysis 
(1) whether the accused has "iniated the dialogue with the 
police following a request for counsel; and ( 2) whether a 
knowing waiver has occurred via the Zerbst standard. Id. at 
28 3 6. Just ice Powel 1 observed: 
The Zerbst standard is one that is widely 
unde-rs-t-ooo and fol lowed. It al so comports 
with common sense. Fragmenting the 
standard into a novel two-step analysis -
if followed literally often would 
frustrate justice as well as common sense. 
Courts should engage in more substantive 
inquires than "who said what first." The 
holding of the Court in Edwards cannot in 
my view fairly be reduceato this. Id. at 
2838.(Footnote omitted). 
Justice Powell agreed with the plurality that once an 
accused has invoked his right to counsel he is certainly 
entitled to additional safeguards. Id. at 2838. The central 
question of whether he has waived the right however is 
uniquely one of fact that should be determined by the totality 
of the circumstance in each case. Id. at 2838. (Footnote 4). 
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In the instant case, since there existed no 
initation by appellant neither _E:_d_w_a_r_d_s_, s_ur_r_a_ nor Bradshaw, 
---------
supra apply. Under and its prcxieny, it is clear that 
appellant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right 
to counsel, and that the police who conducted this 
interrogation, committed no impropriety. 
Even assuming that were applicable, 
it does not necessarily provide a se rule that an attorney 
must be present every time an accused talks with police. The 
court notes in Footnote 6 p. 48fi of Edwards that "[v]arious 
decisions of the courts of appeal are to the effect that a 
valid waiver of an accused's previously invoked Fifth 
Amendment right to counsel is possible." These cases are not 
overruled. The Court goes on to quote from 
Rodriguez - Gastel um, 5 69 F. 2d 48 2, 48 6, cert_:_ 4 36 
u.s. 919 (1978): 
it makes no sense to hold that once an 
accused has requested counsel, he may 
never, until he has actually talked with 
counsel, charge his mind and decide to 
speak with the police without an attorney 
being present. 
The Court in supra rejected the 
invocation of a per se rule on this issue, holding that the 
requirements must be applied with flexibility and 
realism. 
Appellant also cites Peoyle_.2_· _ 48 N.Y. 2rl 
167, 397 N.E. 2d 709 (N.Y. 1979) and several other New York 
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cases for the proposition that once a defendant is represented 
by an attorney, the police may not elicit further statements 
from him. Appellant maintains that Edwards is based on these -----
case. however, is not as extensive in its holding as 
these cases because they are based on an interpretation of the 
New York, rather than the United States, constitution. The 
New York courts have expanded the right to counsel beyond what 
is constitution ally required under Miranda. 
The Nebraska Supreme Court confronted a similar "New 
York" argument in Jackson, 290 N.W. 2d 458 (Neb. 
1980). The defendant in i_ackson, referring to argued 
that the police were precluded from further interrogation in 
the absence of counsel once the defendant has invoked his 
right to counsel. In short, the defendant in supra 
argued that once counsel is appointed there can he no waiver 
unless the waiver took place either in the presence of counsel 
or by counsel. Id. at 461. The Nebraska Supreme Court 
disagreed and emphatically stated: "'Miranda does not go that 
for. 1 " Id. at 461. The court further noted: 
There has been little acceptance of the 
Arthur rule out side New York. Even in 
that--jurisdiction, there appears to be a 
disagreement as to the extent of the rule. 
Id. at 461-462. These cases are therefore also inapposite. 
Once it has been established that the interrogation 
was proper and appellant waived his right to have counsel 
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present, there is no question that the handwritin'J exemplar 
was properly admitted into evidence. Yet appellant contends 
that the handwriting sample violates the right not to give 
evidence against himself. Appellant cites 
Utah, 619 P.2d 315 (1980), in support of this proposition. 
Hansen, however, was a unique case in which the accused was 
ordered by the court to do the affirmative act of writing. 
This court stated that "[w]e do not mean this decision to be 
understood as going beyond its particular facts." 
supra, at 317. The Court reaffirmed its attitude toward 
compelling an accused to furnish handwriting samples in State 
v. Mccumber, Utah, 622 P.2d 353 (1980): 
••• [A] handwriting exemplar requires an 
affirmative act and hence, this case goes 
beyond making observations or comparison 
of an accused's appearance, or his body, 
or its parts or substances obtained 
therefrom. (Mccumber at 358, cit at ions 
ommitted) -----
Hansen v. Owens is inapplicable to the instant case since 
appellant voluntarily gave a handwriting sample. 
The fact that appellant consented to the handwriting 
sample also negates appellant's contention that the police 
should have had either a search warrant or probable cause 
before obtaining the sample. Scheckloth v. Bustamante, 93 
S.Ct. 2041 (1973) held that one exception to the requirements 
of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is 
conducted pursuant to consent. 
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Moreover, the idea that once an accused invokes his 
right to counsel he cannot be searched or consent to a search 
is without merit. An accused may consent to a search in spite 
of the fact that he had invoked his right to counsel because 
these are separate rights. This concept was explained in 
515 F. Supp. 1361 (E.D.N.Y. 1981). 
In discussing the relationship between the holding in Edwards 
and the holding in Schn_eck1=.._o_!-_!":, the court stated: 
Finally, we note the distinction between 
the instant case and the Supreme Court 
opinion in Edwards v. Arizona. In that 
case the once a 
suspect who is being interrogated invokes 
his right to counsel, all questioning and 
examination must halt and may not resume 
unles the suspect himself initiates the 
continuation. Spec if ical ly, the Court 
said that "it is inconsistent with Miranda 
and its progeny for the authorities, at 
their instance, to reinterrogate an 
accused in custody if he has clearly 
asserted his right to counsel." The Court 
was extremely careful to distinguish 
between the Miranda rights, so to speak, 
of a suspect -and his Fourth Amendment 
rights: "Schneckloth does not control the 
issue presentedTn-this case." 
What this case impliedly holds is that 
it is perfectly proper for the authorities 
to initiate inquiry into possible waiver 
of a suspect's Fourth Amendment rights 
even after he has invoked his right to 
counsel. 
at 1368; citations omitted, emphasis added). 
Appellant's contention is unsound, particularly so when the 




Appellant received and unclerstoocl his rights under 
Miranda before the police interrcxiated him for a second time. 
He was advised of his rights to obtain counsel, yet 
affirmatively waived that right. Appellant claimed he "had 
nothing to hide" and agreed to cooperate with the police. 
Although appellant had obtained an attorney three 
months earlier, it was for an unrelated charge, and therefore 
was far removed from the second interrcxiation by both time and 
subject matter. 
Furthermore, appellant may waive his right to an 
attorney by himself. He need not obtain the advice of an 
attorney in deciding he does not require his assistance. 
Indeed, it is doubtful that an attorney would ever decide for 
his client that his client does not need him. 
A E_e_i:_ se rule on this issue would only serve to 
diminish and not protect the rights of the accused. 
Appellant's rights in the instant case were scrupulously 
honored by the police and the circumstances clearly show that 
appellant had intelligently and knowingly waived his rights 
before he was interrcxiated on the forgery charge. For these 
reasons, the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed. 
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